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I. INTRODUCTION
ABC Excavating is a small construction firm specializing in site
preparation work.' The company has been successful for a number of years
on a small scale, providing a comfortable existence for the company's
1. Although the names of the parties are fictional, in all other respects this is a true
story. This case is ongoing. Disbarment proceedings may be public record, but revelation of
them would jeopardize client confidentiality in the present action against the attorney and his
partners.
1
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shareholders, Jack Brown and his wife. Early in 1999, the firm orally
contracted to perform some work in a South Florida county. As is
sometimes the case, the property owner paid the general contractor, and the
general contractor did not pay ABC Excavating. ABC Excavating filed a
lien against the property and, failing any response from either the owner or
the general contractor, ABC Excavating sought to foreclose. With that in
mind, the owners of ABC Excavating turned over all of their meager
paperwork to their attorney, Mike Pfenning of Rodriguez, Marko &
Pfenning, P.A. A year went by, and the statute of limitations for lien
foreclosure expired. Another year went by, and the statute of limitations for
suing on an oral contract expired. During this period, ABC Excavating was
regularly assured by Pfenning that he was filing pleadings and that
everything was going well.
However, nothing was going well. As Pfenning later said in his letter to
the Florida Bar, he was afflicted with a mental disorder that made him put all
of his work into various desk drawers and then forget about it.2 Pfenning
would spend the remainder of his days staring out of the windows of his
office, or would simply not show up for work. His partners were aware of
his behavior but were reluctant to intervene. They were even more reluctant
to inform his clients. Pfenning's partners let their malpractice insurance
lapse. Ultimately, they dissolved the partnership. Since then, Pfenning has
been disbarred. All three partners have liquidated their assets or moved
them into the names of others. Two of the three partners have filed for
bankruptcy and the third is not far behind. ABC Excavating is now seeking
to recover from the attorneys personally, but the bankruptcy actions have all
but eliminated their chances for recovery.
Although the incidence of mental illness and drug abuse among
attorneys is far from negligible, stories this egregious are, fortunately, not
played out every day. Several questions raised by this case include the
following:
What could the Browns have done to mitigate the damage caused
by their attorney?
What could the attorney have done to mitigate or prevent the dam-
age his illness has caused?
What were the responsibilities of the partners to the clients, to the
mentally ill partner, and to the Florida Bar?
2. Incredibly, the original complaint to the bar was filed by a client of Pfenning's for
whom he was prosecuting a malpractice suit against another attorney for neglecting a client's
case.
[Vol. 27:157
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The purpose of this article is to look at the factors involved in these
questions and to attempt to frame answers that may be useful to both clients
and attorneys in looking at the effect mental illness can have on the attorney-
client relationship and on the parties thereto.
Mental illness is a subset of a broad range of conditions of unfitness,
which could preclude an attorney from practicing law. It may, in and of
itself, render an attorney unfit for practice, or it may be the catalyst for other
conduct that violates the rules of professional responsibility.
The overriding issue regarding the conduct precipitated by an attorney's
illness lies in the public policy concern that attorneys act in the public
interest; the public is entitled to a presumption that an attorney licensed to
practice is fit to do so. 4  Failure of this presumption is a failure of the
public's trust,5 and the consequences of such a failure may be far-reaching.
Given that the public policy concern revolves around the attorney's
inability to carry out his or her professional duties, a mental illness that does
not prevent an attorney from effective practice is not at issue here. The fact
that it does not noticeably affect a lawyer's performance makes the incidence
of such illness difficult to track. Such "non-actionable" mental illnesses
3. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4 cmt. (1988).
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as
offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return.
However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinc-
tion was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be
construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as
adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the
practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law,
a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of
those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty,
or breach of trust or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that
category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when con-
sidered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
Id.
4. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Mental or Emotional Disturbance as Defense to or
Mitigation of Charges Against Attorney in Disciplinary Proceeding, 26 A.L.R. 4th 995,
1006-07 (1983).
[Iun disbarment, unlike criminal prosecution or a civil suit for recovery of money based
on an offense or quasi-offense, consideration of the interest and safety of the public os
[sic] of the utmost importance... [it would be wrong] to permit such a person to
continue as an officer of the court and to pursue the privilege of engaging in the
honorable legal profession when he, by his misconduct, has exhibited a lack of integ-
rity and common honesty. And it matters not whether the dishonest conduct stems
from an incapacity to discern between right and wrong... the public has a right to
protection against his activities in the practice of law.
Id.
5. Id.
2002]
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would include many of the disorders formerly labeled as neuroses by the
American Psychiatric Association.6
Mental illness is more difficult to detect in others-and in oneself-
than a physical illness such as hepatitis or tuberculosis.7 To the casual lay
observer, as most of us are, a mental illness will generally manifest itself
through conduct outside of the generally accepted norm; it will become
cause for concern or investigation when it violates the Rules of Professional
Conduct.'
Attorneys are not subject to disciplinary action for being mentally ill,
only for conduct which violates the rules.9 On the other hand, violations of
the rules are not evidence of mental illness, and those attorneys who plead
such illness as the cause of their violations must show that it directly caused
the misconduct.1 ° When a showing of causation is made, disciplinary action
6. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 9-10 (3d ed. 1980). In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association omitted the
former major class of disorders called "neuroses" from its diagnostic manual and replaced it
with several categories such as "affective, anxiety, somatoform" and so on. Id. The rationale
for this change was the absence of a general consensus on the definition of neuroses. Id. For
the purposes of this article, the old adage that neurotics build castles in the sky and psychotics
actually live in them will provide an adequate, if folkloric, distinction.
7. Hepatitis C "[s]ymptoms may include fever, fatigue, abdominal pain, jaundice,
and elevated liver enzymes." HCV Advocate Glossary, at http://www.hepatitis-c-advocate.org
/hepatitis-c-symptoms.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2002). Tuberculosis consists of constant
coughing fits along with spitting up blood; common symptoms of this illness include fever,
inflammation, headache, soreness of throat, palate, breast and lungs. (Tuberculosis, at
http://www.aidsmeds.com/OIs/TB2.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2002)). On the other hand, the
Canadian Mental Health Association states that the symptoms of depression include feelings
of worthlessness, helplessness or hopelessness, difficulty with concentration or decisions,
avoidance of other people, overwhelming feelings of sadness, and thoughts of death or
suicide, which are also among the symptoms of manic depression. Depression & Manic
Depression Symptom Questionnaire, at http://www.truehope.com/nononline_forms/
forms3.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
8. Id.
9. However, evidence of mental illness may be a bar to admission. Since the
introduction of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the
profession's methods of regulating attorney fitness where mental health is an issue have come
under attack as violative of the ADA. This is particularly true with regard to mental health
questions posed on bar applications. See, e.g., Erica Moeser, Yes: The Public Has the Right
to Know About Instability, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1994, at 36; Kathi Pugh, No: Mental Health
Treatment Should Not Block a Career, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1994, at 37.
10. In order for an attorney's alleged illness to be taken into account as a mitigating
circumstance in a disciplinary proceeding, the attorney must "establish any causal link
between his health problems and his 'pattern of serious professional misconduct." In re Stein,
[Vol. 27:157
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will ensue, and the illness will often be treated as a mitigating factor in the
imposition of sanctions." Sanctions will range from disbarment 2 to
censure,13 but will often include suspension pending effective treatment for
the attorney's disorder.'
4
There are certain primary participants in the attorney-client relation-
ship: the client, the attorney, and, under the imputed knowledge doctrine of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the attorney's firm. 15  The
remainder of this article will review the various ways the attorney's mental
illness affects these participants and what, if anything, may be done to
mitigate the effects of the illness on the attorney's work.
11. THE CLIENT
What risks do clients run if they are among those whose cases are
affected by the mental or emotional instability of their attorney? They run
many of the same risks that the Browns encountered in their relationship
with Mr. Pfenning of the earlier example. The possible permutations of
attorney misconduct are numerous, running the gamut from loss of the action
due to statute of limitations problems, to simple cases of inadequate
settlement due to attorney carelessness. 6
Before continuing, it is worth noting that the risk of a client being an
actual victim of an attorney's mental or emotional instability is extremely
low. Although some fifteen-percent of Florida's attorneys will suffer from
career-affecting mental illness or addiction at some point in their lives, 17 the
number of cases these attorneys will negatively affect will probably be small.
596 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting In re Kurtz, 580 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1992));
see also 7 N.Y. Jua. 2d Attorneys at Law § 405 (1997).
11. See Fla. Bar v. Musleh, 453 So. 2d 794, 797 (Fla. 1984); Fla. Bar v. Budish, 421
So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1982); Fla. Bar v. Larkin, 420 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 1982).
12. Fla. Bar v. Horowitz, 697 So. 2d 78, 83 (Fla. 1997) (holding that an attorney may
be disbarred for neglect of clients and for failure to respond to communications from the Bar
despite attorney's clinical depression).
13. Fla. Bar v. Price, 348 So. 2d 887, 890 (Fla. 1977) (punishing the attorney with a
public reprimand and thirty-day suspension).
14. Fla. Bar v. Poplack, 599 So. 2d 116, 118 (Fla. 1992) (suspension for thirty days
and eighteen-month probation); Fla. Bar v. Carbonaro, 464 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 1985)
(three-year suspension continuing until rehabilitation proved).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2002); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
16. See infra Part ll.
17. See infra Part ll.
2002]
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To try to establish some order of magnitude, assume that an attorney
practices thirty years, handles 250 matters per year (a number that may vary
greatly depending on the branch of the law in which one practices), and that
each mentally or emotionally unstable attorney ruins five cases. There are
some 70,000 attorneys in Florida. 1 Using the figures just mentioned, the
mentally or emotionally unstable attorneys will cause problems with some
52,000 matters. Fifty-two thousand matters may sound like the makings of a
plague or a scourge, until one considers that during that same period of time,
some 700,000,000 matters will be handled normally.' 9 In other words, the
chances of one's case being among those negatively affected by the mental
state of the attorney could well be less than one in thirteen thousand.2°
A. Client Responsibilities to the Attorney and the Court
Although the client is the raison d'tre of the attorney's representation,
there is very little in the Rules of Professional Conduct governing responsi-
bilities of the client for his or her case. By their very nature, the rules cannot
directly address client conduct, and what rules there are concern only an
attorney's responses to the implied duties of the client. These implied duties
include a client's candor to the attorney2' and to the tribunal, a client's
obligation to pay for services,23 and a client's obligation to assist in
determining the scope of the representation.24
Despite its strong fiduciary overtones, the relationship between an
26attorney and a client is nevertheless essentially a contractual relationship,
18. Fla. Bar Organization, available at http://www.flabar.org (listing approximately
70,000 attorneys as members of the Florida Bar) (last visited Sept. 7, 2002); see Richard B.
Marx, Impaired Attorneys and the Disciplinary System, 11 FLA. B.J. 14 (Dec. 1999).
19. This hypothetical assumes a forty-year-long career for each of Florida's 70,000
attorneys and 250 cases per attorney per year.
20. In the year ending August 1, 2001, the Florida Bar spent $7,915,314 of the
$12,859,897 it collected in dues on disciplinary matters. In the same time period, there were
38 disbarments, 155 suspensions and 57 public reprimands. The number of bar complaints
filed was 9280 for the period, or one complaint for, approximately, every seven attorneys. The
Florida Bar, updated August 1, 2001, as reported in Christopher C. Copeland, Disciplinary
Proceedings, Practical Legal Issues in Florida: Issues and Answers, National Business
Institute, Inc., 2001.
21. See generally, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2002).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2002).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 16(b)(5) (2002).
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
25. THE FLA. BAR, FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL § 1.38 (6th ed. 2000)
[hereinafter FLA. CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL]; see also, Gerlach v. Donnelly, 98 So. 2d
[Vol. 27:157
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and both sides of the relationship have duties and obligations. The
obligations of clients, other than for payment and the implied duties
mentioned above, revolve primarily around selecting an attorney with whom
27they are comfortable. The word "vibe" is regularly used when selecting an
28
attorney. A general feeling of competence and caring (and reasonableness
of fees) is desirable, as well as a sense that honest communication will flow
in both directions.29 Often, novice or distraught clients will look to the
lawyer as much more than merely legal counsel and will transfer to counsel
"dependencies for guides to conduct in strange circumstance, for nonlegal
advice, and often for approval. 0 0 A lawyer is not one's minister, psychic
advisor or friend. A lawyer is no more than an advisor or advocate in legal
matters.3 '
493, 498 (Fla. 1957) ("[N]o relationship between individuals.. . involves a greater degree of
trust and confidence than that of attorney and client."); In re Clifton, 155 So. 324, 326 (Fla.
1934) ("The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a limited and
dignified sense, and involves the highest personal trust and confidence."); Pilkington v. Rose,
102 So. 751, 752 (Fla. 1925) (Courts will enforce "the utmost good faith and fair dealing on
part of the attorney" in dealings with client.); 610 Lincoln Road, Inc. v. Kelner, P.A., 289 So.
2d 12, 14 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) ("[Vialidity and fairness [of initial agreement between
attorney and client establishing relationship] is generally measured by the ordinary rules
applicable to other contracts." The rule does not establish "that where a controversy arises
between an attorney and client the burden is on the attorney to demonstrate that he has taken
no undue advantage of the client."); Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So. 2d 16 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
26. The terms of the contractual relationship are governed by the express terms of the
written agreement between the attorney and the client, insofar as they do not violate the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar themselves, the by-laws adopted thereunder, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Chapter 454 of the Florida Statutes, the Oath of Admission, case
law which has developed and elucidated these rules, relevant opinions promulgated by the
Professional Ethics Committee of the Florida Bar, and "the attorney is under a duty at all
times to represent his client and handle his client's affairs with the 'utmost degree of honesty,
forthrightness, loyalty and fidelity."' Smyrna Developers, 177 So. 2d at 18; see also Singleton
v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 970 (5th Cir. 1970); Gerlach, 98 So. 2d at 498.
27. BERTRAM HARNET, LAW, LAWYERS AND LAYMEN: MAKING SENSE OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich) 187 (1984).
28. Id.
29. Id. See also FLA. CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL, supra note 25, § 1.
30. HARNETT, supra note 27, at 206.
31. "A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE 9 (2002); see also HARNET', supra
note 27, at 206.
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B. Potential Harms Caused by the Attorney's Mental Illness
From a client's perspective, an attorney may ruin a client's case in two
ways, either through his or her negligence, or through no clearly provable
fault of the attorney. In the case of clear attorney negligence, cases may be
lost for the following reasons:
The attorney lets the statute of limitations lapse.32 Failing alterna-
tive causes of action, rare in the type of straightforward cases
making up the vast majority of legal work, the client's recourse
against the hoped-for defendant simply no longer exists.
33
The attorney fails to file responsive pleadings. If the attorney
fails to file an answer to an adversary's complaint, the client is
faced with a default judgment; 35 failure to comply with discover7
requests or court orders can similarly lead to default judgments.
In these cases, recourse against the erstwhile adversaries is ex-
tremely difficult and may be barred by resjudicata.
The attorney simply fails to prosecute diligently or intelligently.37
The risk of default is heightened if the attorney fails to appear for
hearings or is persistently late, if the attorney neglects to prosecute
the case, or if he or she forgets straightforward but vital elements
32. FLA. STAT. § 95.011 (2001) (failing to initiate an action within the time
limitations defined by the statute is a complete defense, regardless of the cause of the failure.)
A civil action or proceeding, called "action" in this chapter, including one brought by
the state, a public officer, a political subdivision of the state, a municipality, a public
corporation or body corporate, or any agency or officer of any of them, or any other
governmental authority, shall be barred unless begun within the time prescribed in this
chapter or, if a different time is prescribed elsewhere in these statutes, within the time
prescribed elsewhere.
Id.
33. Id.
34. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.110(e). Failure to respond to a complaint is tantamount to a
failure to deny. "Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other
than those as to the amount of damages, are admitted when not denied in the responsive
pleading." Id.
35. FED. R. CIv. P. 55(a) (2000). "When a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules
and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's
default." Id.
36. See, e.g., FED. R. Ctv. P. 16(e), (b)(2)(C) (2000).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3.
[Vol. 27:157
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such as service of process, lis pendens notices in property dis-
putes, or notices of appearance.
Although the experienced client might have enough familiarity with the
law to understand statutes of limitations and responsive pleadings, and thus
know to ask appropriate questions of the attorney, the third scenario is
largely beyond the client's ability and control. In cases where attorney
negligence is not at all clear, cases may be lost in three ways:
On the merits;
39
Through actions of the attorney where the client is unaware that
these actions constitute malpractice; 4°
Through actions of the attorney where the client will be unable to
• • • 41
show that the actions constitute malpractice.
Client recourse against the attorney in these cases is very limited. In the
42
case of a loss on the merits, there would (or should) be no action. If the
client is unaware of the malpractice, then there would be no recourse
38. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.0700). Failure to serve a complaint on a defendant within the
prescribed 120 days and absent "good cause or excusable neglect" will result in a court order
for service within a prescribed time, "dismiss[al] [of] the action without prejudice," or
dismissal from the action of the defendant who was not timely served. Id. A notice of lis
pendens preserves to litigants the status of property involved in litigation and "place[s]
persons who may have an interest in the property on notice of a claim against ... [said]
property." FLA. CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL, supra note 25, § 9-5. See FLA. STAT. § 48.23
(2001).
39. In the absence of malpractice, a loss on the merits is a loss based on the
substantive issues of the case. The merits are the elements or grounds of a claim, the
substantive considerations to be taken into account in deciding a case, as opposed to
extraneous or technical points, especially of procedure. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (7th
ed. 1999). A trial on the merits is a trial on the substantive issues of the case, as opposed to
motion hearing or interlocutory matter. Id. at 1512.
40. If the client is unaware of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules of
Civil Procedure (see, e.g., discussion supra notes 32-38), it follows that the client will be
unaware of any violations of these Rules by an attorney.
41. Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1999). "[IUn a claim for legal
malpractice, a plaintiff must plead and prove the following elements: (1) the attorney's
employment; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the attorney's negligence
was the proximate cause of the client's loss." Id. See, e.g., Companion v. McClin, 645 So. 2d
1109, 1110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Bolves v. Hullinger, 629 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Freeman v. Rubin, 318 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
42. If a case is lost on the merits and there has been no malpractice by the attorney,
the client would have no grounds for a malpractice claim.
9
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because the client did not know there was a basis for a claim. 43 The third
scenario requires the client to show that, had the former attorney been sober,
diligent, timely or sane, the client would not have lost the case."4 Such a suit
involves, in essence, retrying the underlying case, while at the same time
showing that the former attorney's actions materially affected the outcome.45
This is expensive, often lengthy, and almost always unpleasant. Further-
more, chances of success may be low.
46
C. Protecting Oneself as the Client
How can clients protect themselves if they suspect their attorney is
emotionally or mentally unstable? The answer to that lies in the comments
43. A basic requirement of recourse is the ability to state a cause of action. FED. R.
CIv. P. 12 (b)(6). If, as is postulated in supra note 40, the client is unaware of possible
malpractice because of a lack of knowledge of procedural fundamentals, it follows that the
client lacks the requisite knowledge to formulate a cause of action.
44. Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1999). "In a claim for legal
malpractice, the plaintiff must plead and prove following elements: (1) the attorney's
employment; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the attorney's negligence
was proximate cause of client's loss." Id. See, e.g., Companion v. McClin, 645 So. 2d 1109,
1110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Bolves v. Hullinger, 629 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993); Freeman v. Rubin, 318 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Weiner
v. Moreno, 271 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
45. Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Damages In A Trial Within A Trial-A
Critical Analysis Of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 40, 41
(1989) [hereinafter Koffler].
In a legal malpractice action, where a client alleges damage resulting from an attorney's
failure to properly prosecute or defend an action, the client may be required to prove
that he or she would have been successful in prosecuting or defending the underlying
action, if not for the attorney's negligence or other improper conduct. This has resulted
in placing the burden upon the client in a legal malpractice action to prove a "case
within a case", and as it has been described, participate in a "trial within a trial."
Id.
46. Id.
[W]itnesses and records may be difficult to obtain or unavailable and memories may
have faded by the time the legal malpractice action is tried. Legal malpractice actions
are frequently predicated upon an attorney's failure to commence an underlying action
within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations, making difficulties such as
these, because of long lapses in time, significant probabilities. Similar problems exist
where the plaintiff in the legal malpractice action was the defendant in the underlying
action and is required to establish that there was a meritorious defense to the underly-
ing action.
Id. See also Gautam v. De Luca, 521 A.2d 1343, 1348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)
(explaining that "it is often difficult for the parties to present an accurate evidential reflection
or semblance of the original action").
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made by Harnett regarding the selection of the attorney.47 Once the "vibe" is
gone, the client needs to give very serious consideration to changing
48 49
attorneys. No reason need be given. If the client pulls out of the
attorney-client relationship prior to adjudication, the case could possibly be
set back on track by a competent new attorney.
If the client has something more specific than the loss of "vibe" or loss
of trust, such as instances of attorney conduct that violate the law or the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the attorney should be reported to the
appropriate authorities. 50  The state bar associations are by and large self-
policing, but do not have a "police force" of any kind.5' The very nature of
attorney-client privilege prevents the bar from, for example, conducting
audits of attorney conduct or attorney effectiveness among randomly
selected clients.52 Without client complaints regarding an attorney's failures,
the bar will never know.53
47. HARNEMr, supra note 27, at 187-89.
48. Id. at 187. "Trust is a key client attitude. Without it, the relationship is never
good and the results are often suspect." Id. at 189.
49. FLA. CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL, supra note 25, §1.48. "A client may
discharge the attorney at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment of
any outstanding attorneys' fees." Id.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2002) requires that attorneys report
such misconduct, but no such requirement exists for clients. See id. However, for the reasons
stated, this writer would urge clients to do so if the conduct of their attorney caused damage to
them or to their case.
51. Commentary by Robert B. McKay, former Dean of New York University Law
School, The Lawyer's Professional Independence, An Ideal Revisited, John B. Davidson, Ed.,
American Bar Association, Tort and Insurance Practice Section, p. 35.
The legal profession has been and remains remarkably free from external control.
Somehow we have arrogated for ourselves the right of self-regulation from admission
to law school... to the practice of law... and on to discipline as conducted by
lawyers and judges, all of whom are law-trained. It's a self-contained world. The
public can take over if the profession overreaches itself... and if the profession does
not regulate itself in ways that are satisfactory to the public .... The obligation is to
keep our house in order .... We must make sure that we [regulate] in behalf of the
public trust.
Id.
52. Although attorneys, and not clients, are bound by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, this author believes that any audit of this kind would risk exposing aspects of the
attorney-client relationship meant to remain protected by the confidentiality doctrines
expressed in MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, Canon 4 (Rev. 1984).
53. See infra part II. Egregious conduct toward the court or in court may warrant
judicial complaints.
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.M. THE ATFORNEY
The mentally disordered attorney may be psychotic, neurotic, alcoholic,
drug dependent, merely emotionally unstable, or some combination of these.
Alcoholism is widespread in this country and is said to be the third most
serious public health problem, after cancer and heart disease.54 One third of
all suicides involve alcohol as a contributory factor.55  Although problem
drinkers account for about eight percent of the general population,56
alcoholism and other addictions will impair approximately fifteen percent of
the members of the Florida Bar "at some time during their careers. 57 This
figure does not include impairment due to mental illness that is not
manifested through addiction, nor does it include the emotional problems
that harm an attorney's ability to practice effectively.
8
A. The Attorney's Responsibility
An attorney who finds himself or herself sufficiently impaired by any of
these factors has several responsibilities. On a personal level, the first
responsibility should be to seek help.59 Professionally, the first responsibil-
54. Mary-Anne Enoch, M.D., M.R.C.G.P., & David Goldman, M.D., Problem
Drinking and Alcoholism: Diagnosis and Treatment, at http://www.aafp.org/afp/20020201/
441 .html (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Enoch and Goldman].
Alcohol misuse is associated with considerable morbidity and mortality (100,000
deaths annually), social and legal problems, acts of violence, and accidents. Alcohol-
ism is among the most common psychiatric disorders in the general population: the
lifetime prevalence of alcohol dependence, the severe form of alcoholism, is 8 to 14
percent. The ratio of alcohol dependence to alcohol abuse is approximately two to one.
The incidence of alcoholism is still more common in men, but it has been increasing
in women, and the female to male ratio for alcohol dependence has narrowed to one to
two.... Nearly all alcoholics have a comorbid psychiatric disorder, most commonly
anxiety and mood disorders in women and drug abuse and antisocial personality
disorders in men.
Id.
55. DAVIDSON AND NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN EXPERIMENTAL CLINICAL
APPROACH 297 (3d ed. 1982).
56. Enoch and Goldman, supra note 54, at http://www.aafp.orglafp/20020201/441.
html.
57. Marx, supra note 18, at 14.
58. See id.
59. This author believes that an attorney has a duty to her or himself, to family, and to
colleagues to seek to cure, treat, or at least minimize the potentially debilitating effects of
impairment.
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ity should be to the attorney's clients,6° then to the attorney's employers or
partners,6' and finally, to the bar.62 Rule 1.16 (a)(2) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct requires that an attorney terminate the attorney-client
relationship if "the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs
the lawyer's ability to represent the client., 63 Failure to do so violates other
rules, including the requirement of competence, 64 candor to the tribunal,65
and "truthfulness in statements to others."66 By not revealing the impair-
ment, however, the lawyer runs the greater risk of misconduct and of being
found out. The problem is thus doubled because, in addition to an illness or
addiction to overcome, a misconduct violation may lead to sanctions fatal to
67the lawyer's career.
This last thought calls attention to an important distinction: an attorney
suffering from an addiction or a mental illness is not necessarily unable to
68practice law effectively. Neither the courts nor the bar examiners have
ever been able to prove that fitness to practice is directly related to an
absence of mental illness or addiction.69 Many attorneys with emotional
problems are effective, sometimes excellent, attorneys; many with no
diagnosable mental disorders are disciplined for misconduct.7° Unfitness to
practice manifests itself primarily through conduct.7
Cessation or suspension of practice because of mental disorder could be
accomplished either voluntarily or involuntarily: the attorney may
understand that he or she cannot continue without treatment, or may engage
in actionable misconduct.72 The private nature of the former necessitates adearth of research and statistics, but the latter and its consequences have
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.16(a)(2) (Rev. 2002). Inability to
effectively represent a client or failure to withdraw from representation when an attorney's
mental condition affects his or her capabilities are violations of the Model Rules. Id.
61. Failure to inform an employer of an incapacity affecting the ability to practice law
may result in liability to the firm. See infra part IV.
62. R. Regulating Fla. Bar. 3-7.13. An attorney may seek inactive status during
rehabilitation. Id.
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002).
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002).
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002).
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002).
68. Phyllis Coleman and Ronald A. Shellow, Fitness to Practice: A Question of
Conduct, not Mental Illness, May, 1994, Fla. Bar J. 71.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at73.
72. Id. at71.
2002]
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produced a wealth of cases and articles." Attorney disciplinary proceedings
are a matter of public record,74 and a Florida suspension or disbarment
requires an appearance before the Supreme Court of Florida."
1. Voluntary Removal
Attorneys who, despite the nature of their illness or addiction, have the
presence of mind and the courage to temporarily remove themselves from the
practice of law ma voluntarily seek treatment, apply to the bar for place-ment
on inactive status, or seek hospitalization. Seeking hospitalization carries
with it the risk of an involuntary adjudication of incompetence." Attorneys
who voluntarily seek treatment are luckier today than they were just ten years
ago. Several counseling organizations exist to assist drug or alcohol dependent
professionals, 78 and the stigma of mental illness, while still strong, is much less
than it once was. 79  Dramatic improvements in med-ications over the last
decade permit many psychological problems to be treat-ed on an outpatient
basis. 8 More serious problems may often be taken care of on an outpatient
basis after an initial inpatient observation and treatment.81 The same is true for
73. See generally Fla. Bar v. Horowitz, 697 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1997); Fla. Bar v.
Clement, 662 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1995); Fla. Bar v. Grigsby, 641 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 1994); Fla.
Bar v. Condon, 632 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1994); Fla. Bar v. Marcus, 616 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1993);
Fla. Bar v. Poplack, 599 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1992). See, e.g., 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law
§71 (1997); Sarno, supra note 4, at 995.
74. Not only are the proceedings before the Supreme Court available through the
Court Reporter and legal databases, but many of the sanctions imposed have a public aspect to
them. For example, among the requirements of a suspension is that attorneys send a copy of
the suspension to each of their clients. Marx, supra note 18, at 16.
75. "Article V, section 15 (of the Florida Constitution] provides that '[tlhe supreme
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of
law and the discipline of persons admitted."' State v. Palmer, 791 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
76. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.13.
77. Id. "A lawyer who has been adjudicated insane or mentally incompetent.., under
the Florida Mental Health Act shall be [placed on an inactive list] and shall refrain from the
practice of law." Id.
78. In addition to the various "Anonymous" groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous,
Florida Lawyers Assistance (FLA) provides rehabilitation assistance. It is the organization to
which the Supreme Court of Florida sends attorneys if rehabilitation is a condition of their
probation. Marx, supra note 18, at 16.
79. "Fortunately, for almost 20 years the Florida Supreme Court has ... looked
favorably on a lawyer's efforts at rehabilitation." Id.
80. See text infra note 146.
81. Id.
[Vol. 27:157
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 6
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss1/6
2002] Klingen
addiction problems. Any absences due to inpatient treatment will often entail
filing notices of unavailability in an attorney's active cases, s2 and will
require informing all clients of the unavailability. Also, if the length of
treatment will affect the requirement for expeditious litigation,84 cases may
be assigned to other attorneys in the firm. Solo practitioners may file
requests for substitution of counsel and transfer their cases to outside
85counsel. Explanation of the reasons for such a temporary retirement need
86
not be made public. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require
termination only in the case of material impairment of the ability to represent
the client. 87 Out-patient treatment and continuing in practice will not create
a conflict unless the materiality requirement is met.88 An attorney should be
entitled to no less privacy than an ordinary citizen, at least until the ability to
practice is impaired.
Voluntary treatment carries with it the heavy burden of self discipline.
The attorney should continue treatment as directed by his or her doctors and
must have the wherewithal to return to treatment in case of a relapse. In-
house counseling and support may not be available on a formal basis in most
firms. However, candor with one's employers may elicit informal support,
an allowance for needed time off, and most importantly, the respect and
gratitude of the partnership for coming forth with the concerns before a
manifestation by misconduct.
82. The notice of unavailability is a legal nullity, but is regularly filed as a matter of
courtesy. Said notices are often taken into consideration in setting hearing and docket dates,
but not always.
Requests to change the time or place of oral argument are disfavored ... [clounsel
normally are expected to reschedule their other obligations to eliminate any conflicts.
Nevertheless, counsel faced with an irreconcilable conflict may request a change in the
date or time of oral argument. But they must make a showing of good cause before the
court will grant the requested change. [Circuit Rule 34-2]. Advance notice of unavail-
ability: Counsel should apprise the court by letter before the argument date is set if a
potential conflict (e.g., a prolonged absence from the country) is known.
CHRiSTOPHER A. GOELZ & MEREDrrH J. WATrS, CALIr)RNtA PRACInCE GUIDE; FEDERAL NINTH
CIRcurr CtvIL APPELLATE PRACTCE, Ch. 9. Oral Argument: 9-B. Setting Cases For Argument
(d) [9:79-80].
83. Failure to do so would violate MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (1983-
2001).
84. MODEL RULES OF PRO'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (Rev. 1984).
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (Rev. 1984).
86. Nowhere in the Model Rules is there a requirement that an attorney reveal
personal matters to clients. Only when such personal matters may impair the ability of the
attorney's duties towards clients do the Model Rules come into play. See id. at 1.16(a)(2).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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2. Inactive Bar Status
An attorney may also apply to the Bar for placement on inactive
status. 89 The Florida Bar provides that an attorney who has not been
adjudicated incompetent, but who is incapable of practicing law because of
physical or mental illness, may be classified as an inactive member.9 Once
so classified, the lawyer is required to refrain from the practice of law even
though there have been no allegations of misconduct. 91  Proceedings
regarding inactive members are processed under the Rules of Discipline in
the same manner as proceedings involving misconduct.92 Inactive members
may be reinstated upon petition to and approval by the Board of Governors,
and if such a petition is rejected, it is subject to review by the Supreme Court
of Florida.
93
To take such a step is certainly more drastic than the voluntary
treatment described above. First, it prevents the attorney from practicing
and, in so doing, takes away his or her livelihood. The inability to earn a
living may have serious consequences on the attorney's personal life, which
may in turn exacerbate the very reasons he or she requested inactive status in
the first place. Second, inactive status is a matter of public record.94 The
attorney will have exposed the most private of concerns to the world at large,
and be subject to greater scrutiny from the bar and colleagues than in the
case of voluntary treatment.95 Finally, the attorney runs the risk of not being
able to be reinstated.96
89. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.13(a).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Attorney status is provided along with the attorney's name on the Florida Bar's
website at http://www.flabar.orgl.
95. Although the Florida Board of Bar Examiners asks bar applicants a series of
questions relating to mental illness (see Coleman & Shellow, supra note 68), this author has
found no requirement that practicing attorneys keep the Bar abreast of the status of their
mental or physical health, as long as any problems remain below the materiality threshold in
MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(2). Even compliance with Rule 1.16(a)(2)-
voluntary withdrawal from representation-has no reporting requirement. In the absence of a
reporting requirement, an attorney's private concerns would remain private. There would be
no scrutiny because no one would (or should) know that the attorney has sought treatment.
96. Reinstatement is by petition to and approval by the Board of Governors, subject to
Supreme Court review. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.13.
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B. Adjudication of Insanity or Mental Illness
Adjudication of insanity or mental illness will assure an attorney of
inactive status.97 Even in the absence of misconduct, the courts will suspend
the license of an attorney found to be mentally incompetent. In The Florida
Bar v. Worthington,9" the court stated that Article I1 of the Florida Bar's
Integration Rule" requires that "a lawyer who has been adjudged mentally
incompetent shall be suspended from the practice of law... subject to any
rights he may have to apply for reinstatement at the proper time and upon
proper showing."l1°
If the attorney waits until the illness or addiction manifests itself
through misconduct, the costs might increase dramatically. Although mental
illness may be considered a mitigating factor in the severity of the discipline
meted out, m  the defense of NGRI (not guilty by reason of insanity) appears
not to exist when applied to the rules of professional conduct. The various
state bars appear to have applied the equivalent of a doctrine of strict
liability regarding attorney compliance, especially regarding the handling of
trust funds.10 2 Even innocent negligence resulting in no damage to any party
may be grounds for suspension or disbarment.l
0 3
The Supreme Court of Louisiana declared that "mental defects [which
render] an [officer] of the [court] incapable of distinguishing between right
97. A lawyer who has been adjudicated insane or mentally incompetent under the
Florida Mental Health Act shall be placed on an inactive list and shall refrain from the practice
of law. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.13(b).
98. 276 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1973).
99. FLA. STAT. § 32 (1999). Superseded. The superseding provisions to the Bylaws
Under the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar may be found in Chapter 2, Bylaws of the
Florida Bar of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
100. Worthington, 276 So. 2d at 39-40.
101. For example, "disbarment may be excessive discipline when mitigating evidence
of mental or substance abuse problems cast doubt upon the intentional nature of the attorney's
misconduct." Fla. Bar v. Condon, 632 So. 2d 70, 72 (Fla. 1994). See generally Sarno, supra
note 4, at 995.
102. "[M]isuse of trust account funds is one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can
commit and disbarment is normally presumed to be the appropriate discipline." Condon, 632
So. 2d at 71.
103. Mark Sturman, a former attorney in North Miami, opted for a voluntary
resignation of five years rather than face possibly greater discipline. Controls over his firm's
trust account were weak. Although all parties were paid, and there was no hint of deliberate
impropriety, some parties were paid later than they should have been, which precipitated the
original complaint and the Bar's subsequent action. From a presentation by Mr. Sturman at
Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center in April, 2002.
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and wrong [may] exempt him from criminal responsibility... or
even.., civil liability for a tort."' 0'4  However, such defects will not
"exonerate a lawyer from the consequences of his professional miscon-
duct."'105  While it might "not be humane to punish by" incarceration a
person unable to understand the wrongfulness of his acts, "it is quite another
matter to permit such a person to continue as an officer of the court."'
°6
Unlike the considerations of punishment or restitution in criminal or civil
matters, the interest and safety of the public are of the utmost importance in
disbarment proceedings.' °7 The public has a right to protection from a
lawyer who, regardless of the cause, exhibits a lack of integrity and common
honesty. 108
A New Jersey court believed that the' public also had a right to
protection from attorneys who abused the potential promise of mitigated
punishment for misconduct available to the mentally impaired. 09 The court
expressed concern over the growing number of attorneys charged with
misconduct who admitted themselves to hospitals for treatment of depression
or anxiety, and then used the excuse of temporary mental disorder as the
cause of their misconduct.'" 0
C. Mitigation
Regardless of the form of mental disorder, any mitigation of discipline
for misconduct will be contingent upon a showing of causation."'I  The
attorney will be required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that,
but for the mental disorder, the attorney would not have engaged in the
misconduct. 1 2 Further, an attorney must show that he or she is actively
seeking treatment, or that he or she has been rehabilitated." 3
104. La. State Bar Ass'n v. Theard, 62 So. 2d 501, 503 (La. 1952) (citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 504.
108. Id.
109. In re McManus, 381 A.2d 352, 353 n.l (N.J. 1978).
110. Id.
111. 7 N.Y. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 405 (1997). On the other hand, in Clement, the
Florida Bar disbarred an attorney where it was shown that his "misconduct was not a direct
result of his bipolar disorder." Fla. Bar v. Clement, 662 So. 2d 690, 700 (Fla. 1995).
112. Clement, 662 So. 2d at 700.
113. See, e.g., In re Berkowitz, 730 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (App. Div. 2001). Sanction of
less than disbarment, given an attorney's "expressed remorse, the absence of venal
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Gregory G. Sarno, author of several articles dealing with mental illness
and attorney discipline, divides his review of the relevant cases intofive
categories: 4 alcoholism, drug dependence, neuroses, psychoses, and other
disorders. 15 Addiction to alcohol and other drug dependencies are often
included in discussions of mental illness, in part because they are considered
mental disorders in and of themselves, and also because they are often
symptomatic of, or comorbid with, some other mental disorder."
1. Alcoholism
It has generally been held that alcoholism is not an excuse for unethical
behavior,' 7 but courts differ as to whether it should be considered a
mitigating factor in discipline." 8 The courts must weigh the public policy
factors of a disapproval of alcohol addiction against the counterproductive
effect on the goal of sobriety which a lengthy suspension would have on the
affected attorney."I9
Attorneys asserting alcoholism as a defense to charges of professional120
misconduct have been met with varying degrees of success. Punishments
have ranged from disbarment 121 to reprimand, 122 the severity predicated more
on the nature of the misconduct than on its cause. For example, Thomas
intent... [and the] commencement of psychotherapy to combat his depression." Id. at 121; In
re Milloy, 571 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1997).
[P]sychological disability will mitigate discipline if the attorney proves by clear and
convincing evidence that five factors are met: (1) the attorney has a severe psychologi-
cal problem; (2) the psychological problem was the cause of the misconduct; (3) the
attorney is undergoing treatment and making progress; (4) the recovery has arrested the
misconduct; and (5) the misconduct is not apt to recur.
Milloy, 571 N.W.2d at 46 (citing In re Weyrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1983)).
114. Sarno, supra note 4, § 1.
115. 46 AM. JUR. 2d Proof of Facts 563 (1986).
116. "Nearly all alcoholics have a comorbid psychiatric disorder, most commonly
anxiety and mood disorders in women and drug abuse and antisocial personality disorders in
men." Enoch and Goldman, supra note 54, at http://www.aafp.orglafp1/20020201/44l.htm.
117. Id. See, e.g., People ex. rel. 11. State Bar Ass'n v. Tracey, 145 N.E. 665, 666 (111.
1924).
118. Sarno, supra note 4, § 9(a); see, e.g., In re Houtchens, 555 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1977)
(mitigation considered); In re Laury, 706 P.2d 935 (Or. 1985) (mitigation not considered).
119. See Sarno, supra note 4, § 2.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Silva, 633 P.2d 538 (Haw. 1981); People v.
Moore, 561 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1977).
122. See, e.g., La. State Bar Ass'n v. Mundy, 423 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1982); In re
Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1982).
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Larkin was suspended by the Florida Bar for failing to appear at the
continuation of a trial, and for neglecting other legal matters, after it was
shown that the misconduct was "totally from [the] effects of alcohol
abuse." 123 His willingness to seek rehabilitation resulted in a suspension of
ninety-one days and until such time as rehabilitation was established to the
satisfaction of the Bar.124 Similarly, Ray Hill125 and William Blalock' 26 were
indefinitely suspended from practice until restitution was made for the fees
collected from the clients who were affected by their misconduct as well as
for the cost of the proceedings against them, and until they were able to
convince the court of their rehabilitation.1 7 In New Jersey, Mr. Gilliam's
misappropriation of client funds was grounds for disbarment, given that his
comprehension and will power were not sufficiently impaired by his alcohol
addiction to excuse his misconduct. 128
2. Drug Dependence
Drug dependence as a defense to misconduct has been met with
responses similar to those found in cases where alcoholism was asserted as a
defense, except there are no reported cases of discipline being reduced to
mere censure or reprimand. 29 There is no evidence to indicate if this is
because drug-dependent attorneys commit more egregious ethical violations
than their alcoholic counterparts, whether the courts have less sympathy for
drug abuse than for alcohol abuse, or if the courts believe that rehabilitation
from drug dependency is more arduous than recovery from alcohol
dependency. In any event, the least severe punishment rendered against an
attorney for misconduct linked to drug abuse was suspension for a definite
time. 13 However, disbarment is not uncommon. 131 Remorse, rehabilitation,
123. Fla. Bar v. Larkin, 420 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 1982).
124. Id.
125. In re Hill, 298 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1974).
126. Fla. Bar v. Blalock, 325 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 1976).
127. Hill, 298 So. 2d at 163.
128. In re Gilliam, 524 A.2d 810 (N.J. 1987).
129. Sarno, supra note 4, § 9.
130. Id.
131. Disbarment was the proper discipline for an attorney who was convicted for drug
abuse, misappropriated client's funds, neglected his duties as executor of estate, and ignored
orders of probate court and court hearing disciplinary matter. Disciplinary Counsel v.
Connaughton, 665 N.E.2d 675, 675-76 (Ohio 1996); "Addiction to... drugs will not excuse
conduct on the part of the attorney warranting disbarment." In re Abney, 447 S.E.2d 848, 850
(S.C. 1994); In re Schlesinger, 607 N.Y.S.2d 462 (App. Div. 1994) (disbarring attorney,
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full restitution, and a willingness to help others recover from addiction will
assist the attorney in mitigating punishment. 32  Alan Larkin avoided the
presumptive sanction of disbarment for misappropriation of client funds in
this way.133  The Supreme Court of Florida overruled the Florida Bar's
request for disbarment and held that Larkin's misconduct was directly
caused by his addiction. 34 It noted that his remorse, subsequent rehabilita-
tion and his efforts to help others militated in his favor, and reduced the
proposed punishment to a three-year suspension.
135
3. Anxiety and Dissociative Disorders
Neurosis is no longer considered a distinct category of mental disorder
by the American Psychiatric Association 36 due to the absence of consensus
regarding its meaning. 37  The classification has been replaced by several
categories, including affective, anxiety, somatoform, dissociative, and
psychosexual disorders. 38  However, in lay terms, "neurotics" can be
notwithstanding indication that attorney suffered from drug addiction, was "being treated by a
physician and [was] willing to participate in.. . [bar association] program for lawyers").
132. See, e.g., In re Berkowitz, 730 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (App. Div. 2001); In re Milloy,
571 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1997).,
133. Larkin, 420 So. 2d at 1081.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Sarno, supra note 4, § 2.
137. "Some clinicians limit the term to its descriptive meaning [as indicating a painful
symptom in someone with intact reality testing] whereas others also include the concept of a
specific etiological process," an unconscious conflict arousing anxiety, leading to maladaptive
use of defense mechanisms, and resulting in symptom formation. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 9 (3d ed. 1980).
138. Sarno, supra note 4, § 2.
Mood disorders (affective disorders): A group of heterogeneous, typically recurrent
illnesses including unipolar (depressive) and bipolar (manic-depressive) disorders that
are characterized by pervasive mood disturbances, psychomotor dysfunction, and
vegetative symptoms; [Anxiety disorders: Excessive, almost daily, anxiety and worry
for greater than six months about a number of activities or events.] Somatoform
disorders: A group of psychiatric disorders characterized by physical symptoms that
suggest but are not fully explained by a physical disorder and that cause significant
distress or interfere with social, occupational, or other functioning; Dissociative
disorders: Failure to integrate one's memories, perceptions, identity, or consciousness
normally; Psychosexual disorders include sexual dysfunctions, the most common form
of psychosexual disorder seen by the practicing physician; gender identity disorders;
and paraphilias.
21
Klingen: The Mentally Ill Attorney
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
distinguished from "psychotics" by their general ability to maintain insight
and to be less affected in their day-to-day living.'39 Attorneys invoking one
of the neuroses as a defense or a mitigating factor to their professional
misconduct have been disbarred or suspended, sometimes indefinitely,
sometimes until rehabilitated. 14  Probationary terms often accompany a
suspension.141
4. Psychosis
A diagnosis of psychosis would at one time have been the death knell
for an attorney's career. Traditionally, the term psychosis has been used to
denote mental disorders so severe that the affected individual is out of touch
with reality. 142  Psychoses are profound, sweeping mental disorders
characterized by severe disturbances of perception, thought processes,
feelings and behavior, and often include a retreat from, or perversion of,
social relationships and a disintegration of the personality structure.
43
Fortunately, recent advances in psychiatric treatment and medication allow
some psychotics to lead much improved lives, and the promise of more
complete recoveries may be possible as research continues in this rapidly
developing field. 144 Other than disbarment or suspension, further types of
discipline for attorneys claiming psychosis as a mitigating factor in
THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY § 15, ch. 186-89, 192 (Mark H. Beers &
Robert Berkow eds., 17th ed. 1999), available at http://www.merck.com/pubs/mmanual/
sections.htm (hereinafter MERCK MANUAL].
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Sarno, supra note 4, § 2.
143. Id.
144. During the 1990s there have been some dramatic advances in the treatment of
schizophrenia. Just as the serotonin re-uptake inhibitor (SRI) class of antidepressants has
largely replaced the older and more problematic tricyclic antidepressants (based in large part
on safety and side-effect considerations), a shift in the treatment of schizophrenia is now
taking place. Some quite recent studies indicate that newly available treatments for
schizophrenia may offer substantial clinical advantages over the older standard antipsychotic
(or "neuroleptic") medications. In September 1996, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved another new atypical antipsychotic, olanzapine, for use in schizophrenia, and
quetiapine was approved in September 1997. Several additional atypicals are currently in
large-scale clinical trials and/or pending FDA approval, including sertindole and ziprasidone.
David Shore, M.D., Editor-in-Chief, Recent Developments in Atypical Antipsychotic
Medications, Schizophrenia Bulletin, accessed at http://mentalhealth. about.com/library/drugs/
blatyp-d.htm.
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misconduct have included the ability to continue practicing subject to
compliance with the recommendation of voluntary psychiatric aid and
consultation for several years.145
5. Other Disorders
Samo's final category of mental disorder is labeled "Other Disorders,"
and includes "burn-out" and emotional distress brought on by trauma or by
severe family or financial difficulties. 146 Suffering from intense emotional
upheaval, precipitated by the dissolution of his marriage, saved Val Patarini
from disbarment after he hired a "muscle man" to threaten his ex-spouse and
inflict harm on his ex-spouse's counsel. 47 Although the court seriously
considered disbarment, it found that the attorney's long, unblemished record
combined with the severity of the distress caused by the divorce was
sufficient to preclude a more serious punishment than the one-year
suspension it imposed.148
Actual misconduct or findings of misconduct are not always a
prerequisite to suspension. 149  In 1973, the Florida Bar temporarily
suspended M. C. Scofield for being intoxicated in open court, denying ever
having seen clients who had given him a retainer, and pulling a pistol on
clients. 150 The court stopped short of finding him guilty of specific acts of
misconduct, perhaps as a kindness in view of his advanced age' 51 and
perceived senility. 152 In making its decision, the court relied on the
Integration Rule,153 which provides that an attorney not adjudicated
incompetent or accused of misconduct shall be placed on the inactive list
(suspended) when it is shown that he or she is incapable of practicing law.'
If inability to practice is suspected by conduct unrelated to the practice of
law, the court may order a psychiatric evaluation with an emphasis on
determining the attorney's competence.' 55 Failure to comply with a request
145. Id.
146. Sarno, supra note 4, § 7.
147. Fla. Bar v. Patarini, 548 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (Fla. 1989).
148. Id.
149. See Fla. Bar re. Arthur, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S551 (Sept. 4, 1997); Fla. Bar v.
Hughes, 504 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1987); Fla. Bar v. Scofield, 287 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1973).
150. Scofield, 287 So. 2d at 285.
151. Id. at 287. He was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1916.
152. Id.
153. R. Regulating Fla. Bar, 11.02.
154. Scofield, 287 So. 2d at 286.
155. Hughes, 504 So. 2d at 751.
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for such an evaluation will result in suspension until the evaluation is
performed. 156  In Florida Bar re Arthur,157 attorney's petition for her
removal from suspension was denied while she still refused to comply with
the evaluation request.158
6. The Effect of the ADA in Attorney Misconduct Proceedings
Attempts by some attorneys to invoke the ADA 159 as precluding
punishment for mental disorders have failed.' 6° In The Florida Bar v.
Clement,16 the court held that, although Clement's bipolar disorder was a
disability under the ADA, the ADA did not prevent the court from
sanctioning Clement for misconduct. 162 Furthermore, the court found that
the misconduct was not caused by Clement's disorder and that ADA
protection was therefore not available. 163 The court went on to point out
that, even if the disorder were the direct cause of Clement's misconduct, and
given that Clement suffered from a recognized disability, he was not a
"qualified" individual under the definition of the ADA.' 64 The court held
that Clement was not qualified to be an attorney "because he committed
serious misconduct and reasonable accommodations were not possible."'
165
Three years later, the Supreme Court of Ohio cited Clement in finding that
the ADA does not preclude disbarment of an attorney with bipolar disorder
for misappropriation of client funds. 166
Malpractice insurance is unlikely to protect the mentally disordered
attorney from the pecuniary consequences of misconduct. 167  Misconduct
156. Id.
157. 22 Fla. L. Weekly at S551.
158. Id.
159. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12131 (2002).
160. The first of these cases was In re Wolfgram, 7 Nat'l Disability Law Rep. (NDLR)
45, 149 (Cal. Bar Ct. Aug. 22, 1995). See also State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 919
P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1996); Fla. Bar v. Clement, 662 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1995).
161. 662 So. 2d at 690.
162. Id. at 699-700.
163. Id. at 700.
164. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131. The ADA requires that employers make "'reasonable
modification' for individuals who are otherwise qualified to perform the demands of a certain
job (in the case of mental disorder, an employer may grant the employee permission to seek
treatment during working hours). Clement, 662 So. 2d at 700.
165. Clement, 662 So. 2d at 700.
166. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Komarek, 702 N.E.2d 62, 67 (Ohio 1998).
167. Prasad v. Allstate Ins. Co., 644 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1994). Intentional act exclusions
are typical for all insurance policies, and professional liability insurance is no exception. Id.
[Vol. 27:157
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 6
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss1/6
20021 Klingen
caused by mental illness is generally viewed by insurance carriers even more
narrowly than it is viewed by the Bar. 68  Any act which the attorney
commits is considered intentional, and the concept of mens rea is inapplica-
ble to the insurance adjuster's analysis.' 69
IV. THE ATrORNEY'S FIRM
Mental disorders may have severe consequences for attorneys and
clients, but the structure of the Model Rules and their progeny is such that
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the actions of the insane are not "accidents" and are
thus not exempt from intentional act exclusions. Id.
[W]e hold that an injury inflicted by an insured who is psychotic is not an 'accident'
and is an intentional act within the meaning of the policy provisions at issue if the
insured intends to cause the injury even if the insured's conduct is the result of the
insured's mental condition.
Id. at 992.
[A] second line of authority concludes that an injury inflicted by an insane person is
intentional if the actor understands the physical nature and consequences of the act.
This is true even if the actor is unable to distinguish right from wrong. This second line
of authority is embraced by a number of other state supreme courts. See Shelter Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Williams, 248 Kan. 17, 804 P.2d 1374 (Kan. 1991) (an injury inflicted by
an insured who is mentally ill is intentional within the meaning of the policy provision
excluding coverage for intentional acts of the insured if the insured understands the
nature and quality of his acts and intends to cause the injury, even though the insured
may have been unable to recognize his conduct as wrongful); ... Economy Preferred
Ins. Co. v. Mass, 242 Neb. 842, 497 N.W.2d 6 (Neb. 1993) (shooter who was found
not guilty in criminal trial by reason of insanity still "intended" the results of his
actions because he knew he was shooting a gun; however, if he thought he was peeling
banana at the time he fired the gun, insanity might preclude application of intentional
injury exclusion clause); Johnson v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 350 S.E.2d 616 (Va. 1986)
(coverage of mentally ill insured who shot and injured friend was precluded by inten-
tional injury exclusion clause where insured was aware of fact that he was shooting
friend, but believed God ordered him to do so); Municipal Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mangus,
443 S.E.2d 455 (W.Va. 1994) (coverage under an intentional injury exclusion clause
may be denied when the one who commits a criminal act has a minimal awareness of
the nature of his or her act; the test for criminal insanity is appropriate only in a crimi-
nal trial and has no applicability to the interpretation of this issue). We agree with the
latter line of authority because we find that a person who is considered insane may still
be capable of entertaining the intent to commit certain acts, even if that intent is the
consequence of a delusion or affliction. For instance, an insane or mentally ill person
can still make plans to harm another, going so far as to obtain the weapon to be used
and to seek out the victim. By any stretch of the imagination, the person "intended"
the act against the victim, even if the person did not fully understand what he or she
was doing at the time of the crime.
Id. at 994-95.
168. See Prasad, 644 So. 2d at 995.
169. Id.
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the attorney's firm will not be immune from repercussions either. The
following section discusses the far-reaching consequences of mental disorder
and misconduct for the attorney's employers or partners.
Will the misconduct of the mentally disordered attorney give rise to
liability on the part of his or her employer? The firm employing the
mentally disordered has two duties in this regard. The Rules of Professional
Conduct provide that law firms must have in place managerial controls
reasonably designed to give "reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the
firm conform to the Rules."' 7 ° Secondly, a lawyer having knowledge that
another lawyer has conmuitted a violation of the rules which is to "a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects [is required to] inform the appropriate professional
authority."'' In other words, law firms are responsible for catching,
reporting, and correcting the misconduct of their associates and partners, and
failure to do so may lead to sanctions against the partners.
The use of the word "reasonable" in Chapter Five of the Model Rules
implies a recognition that no amount of office procedures could catch every
instance of misconduct.172 A determined attorney could conceal misconduct
for quite some time without giving rise to a Rule 5.1 violation on the part of
the firm. There have, nevertheless, been limits to the court's willingness to
interpret what is reasonable. 73 In a case cited three times for the same issue,
Florida's Court of Appeal for the Fifth District held that "presumed access
of a partner [in a law firm] to confidential information imputes knowledge of
that information to others in [the] firm,"174 implying that only deliberate
efforts at concealment by the wrongdoer will excuse a firm's lack of
knowledge and thus, shield it from liability. 1
75
170. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (a) (1983).
171. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (a) (1983).
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (Rev. 1984). "A partner in a law
firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional
Conduct." Id.
173. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
174. Id. at 1053.
175. Id. Courts appear to be split on this issue. For example, Florida and Illinois
impute knowledge to partners, but South Carolina requires actual knowledge. See Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 374 So. 2d at 1051. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, in In re Georgou, 145 B.R. 36 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1992), cited the Illinois Partnership
Act as controlling the vicarious liability of partners in a law finn: §13, Partnership Bound by
Wrongful Partner's Act states as follows:
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A. The Attorney's Duty to Mitigate
The comments to Florida's Rule 4-5.1, modeled after the ABA's rule
5.1, state that "[t]he supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable
consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct
occurred."' 176 The comments add that, "if a supervising lawyer knows that a
subordinate [has] misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotia-
tion, [both] the supervisor [and] the subordinate ha[ve] a duty to correct the
resulting misunderstanding."' 177 Thus, beyond the duty to report misconduct,
which will be discussed below, it should be clear that supervisory attorneys
and, by extension, law firms, have an affirmative duty to mitigate the
damage to the client and to the judicial process as a whole.
In this author's opinion, there is also an additional duty found nowhere
in the rules. It is a duty toward a coworker that is both professional and
humanitarian. In the event a coworker exhibits signs of mental disorder, but
has not yet committed misconduct, it should be incumbent upon the partners
to recommend counseling and to assist to the extent possible. Such
assistance may include reassigning the attorney's cases so as to put them out
of reach of the potential for damage through misconduct. It may also include
bar or firm sponsored rehabilitation programs, or simply mandating time off
to seek treatment. No matter what form it may take, or however painful,
early intervention is vastly preferable to the harm caused to all parties by
preventable misconduct.
There are some nuances to the extent that liability will accrue to a law
firm for the misconduct of one of its members. While the general rule is that
Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of
business of the partnership or with the authority of his copartners, loss or injury is
caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred,
the partnership is liable therefore to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting
to act.
Id. South Carolina emphasized the need for actual knowledge of wrongdoing in In re
Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10 (S.C. 2001). It cited Rule
5.1(c)(1) and (2) of the state's Rules of Professional Conduct. These sections provide:
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct if: (1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the
other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and
knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but
fails to take reasonable remedial action.
Id.
176. FLA. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 4-5.1 cmt. (1988).
177. Id.
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a "firm is liable for the attorney/drafter's misconduct to the same extent as
he is,"1 78 an agency relationship must exist between the attorney and the firm
in order for the firm to incur liability. 179 Moreover, liability will not extend
beyond the attorney if the attorney is "of counsel" and not held out as acting
on behalf of the firm."8 This holds true even if the attorney's name is on the
firm letterhead. 81  Attempts by plaintiffs to extend "of counsel" liability to
the firm on the theory of agency by estoppel have also failed.182 Recognizing
generally accepted practices in partnership law, some courts have stated that
firms may not be liable for the misconduct of attorneys acting outside of the
scope of their authority. 183 In David v. Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock
Co.,184 the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals held that the determination
of the attorney's scope of authority was a question for the finder of fact, and
refused to hold the respondent law firm liable for the actions of its employee,
pending further investigation. 185
B. Duty to Report Another Attorney's Misconduct
While there is some latitude and interpretation permitted concerning the
duty to prevent misconduct, there is none at all regarding its reporting once
misconduct has been found. Cases such as Himmel186 and Skolnick v.
178. In re Klenk, 612 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222 (App. Div. 1994) (citations omitted).
179. Trimble-Weber v. Weber, 695 N.E.2d 344, 347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). "The Code
of Professional Responsibility does not define 'of counsel,' but does provide that '[a] lawyer
may be designated 'Of Counsel' on a letterhead if the lawyer has a continuing relationship
with a lawyer or law firm, other than as a partner or associate."' Id. (citing DR 2-102(A)(4)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 347-48.
183. In Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So. 2d 381, 385
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated:
The law firm's liability in this case turns on the plaintiffs' ability to attribute [its
employee's] actions to the firm. An employer is responsible for the wrongful acts of its
employee if the conduct of the employee is within the scope of his employment, which
includes acts "of the kind he is employed to perform" and that conduct "occurs sub-
stantially within authorized time and space limits and ... is activated at least in part by
a purpose to serve the [employer]."
Id. See Kane Furniture Corp. v. Miranda, 506 So. 2d 1061, 1067 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1987); Whetzel v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 266 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Gates v. Utsey, 177 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965); see also David v.
Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock Co., 607 N.E.2d 1173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
184. 607 N.E.2d 1173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
185. Id. at 1183-84.
186. 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).
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Altheimer & Gray'87 are an indication of the gravity with which the courts
regard the reporting of misconduct. The courts have consistently held that
the requirement to report misconduct is absolute, 188 leaving attorneys to
wander about in a minefield where reporting is required, but where the
determination of what constitutes misconduct remains open for interpreta-
tion.
Comments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.3 read as
follows:
If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the
failure to report any violation would itself be a professional of-
fense. Such a requirement existed in many jurisdictions but proved
to be unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to
those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously en-
deavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is, therefore, required in
complying with the provisions of this Rule. The term "substantial"
refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quan-
tum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware.189
Generally speaking, the type of misconduct to be reported is no surprise:
misappropriation of client funds, bribery, blatant violations of confidential-
ity, fraud, forgery of a client's signature, and so on.190 Difficulties arise
when the misconduct is not so clearly defined,' 9' where the reporting
187. 730 N.E.2d 4 (111. 2000).
188. "Ten states follow the Model Code of Professional Responsibility's formulation
that requires reporting of all ethical violations including technical infractions. (Alabama,
Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio and Vermont). The
majority of states including Texas, follow the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
requires a substantial violation." Bruce A. Campbell, To Squeal or Not to Squeal: A Thinking
Lawyer's Guide to Reporting Lawyer Misconduct, 1 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 265, 268 n.12 (1999)
[hereinafter Campbell]; see also Skolnick, 730 N.E.2d at 14.
189. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. (2002).
190. Campbell, supra note 188, at 274.
191. For example, in Attorney U v. The Mississippi Bar, 678 So. 2d 963, 972 (Miss.
1996), the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that U did not have sufficient knowledge of S's
misconduct to require him to report it. In so holding, the court stated:
[t]hat standard must be an objective one, however, not tied to the subjective beliefs of
the lawyer in question. The supporting evidence must be such that a reasonable lawyer
under the circumstances would have formed a firm opinion that the conduct in ques-
tion had more likely than not occurred and that the conduct, if it did occur, raises a
substantial question as to the purported offender's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to
practice law in other respects. Id.
Additionally, Bruce Campbell states:
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attorney notices a pattern of incidents that as a group are reportable but
individually are not,192 and particularly, where the reporting attorney must
make a judgment call and knows he or she could be mistaken. 193 This is
further exacerbated by the feeling that reporting is "squealing."' 194 To quote
Campbell: "Few rules... stir more emotion and potential controversy than
the 'squealer' or 'snitch' rule .... [t]he 'schoolyard' refrain of tattletale still
rings... in our minds." 195 Tattletale or not, failure to "squeal" can be costly.
A Texas attorney was suspended for thirty-nine months for violating "rules
regarding candor toward the tribunal [for failing] to report another lawyer's
misconduct."196
If one covers for a partner at a hearing once because the partner was
still intoxicated from the previous night's activities, does the intoxication
raise a substantial question as to the partner's fitness? If one covers for the
partner a second, a third, or a fourth time? Who decides when conduct
becomes reportable misconduct? An attorney confronted with such a
situation may consult the state's ethics committee for guidance, 19' but the
final determination rests with the state's highest court of appeal.19' if the
ethics committee and the court differ in an interpretation, the court prevails
and the attorney may9 face sanctions despite his reliance on the ethics
committee's opinion.
See Nebraska Ethics Op. 89-4; "Because knowledge in the reporting rule means more
than a suspicion, a lawyer need not report mere suspicions of code violations." Id.
New Mexico's position is that the mandatory obligation to report occurs "when a
lawyer has a substantial basis for believing a serious ethical violation has occurred,
regardless of the source of that information." New Mexico Ethics Op. 1988-8 (un-
dated). The Committee on Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York Bar states that a "reporting lawyer must be in possession of facts that
clearly establish a violation of the disciplinary rules." New York City Ethics, Op.
1990-3 (1990). The District of Columbia Bar Ass'n has concluded that a lawyer is
compelled to report "only if she has a clear belief that misconduct has occurred, and
possesses actual knowledge of the pertinent facts." District of Columbia Bar, Op. 246
(Revised 1994).
Campbell, supra note 188, at 277.
192. See Attorney U, 678 So. 2d at 972.
193. Id.
194. Campbell, supra note 188, at 265.
195. Id.
196. Bruce A. Campbell & Ruth A. Kollman, The Lady or the Tiger? Opening the
Door to Lawyer Discipline Standards, 1 Fla. Coastal L.J. 231, 248 (1999) (citing Grievance
Disciplinary Actions, 61 Tex B.J. 281, 283 (1998)).
197. See, generally, Campbell, supra note 188; Attorney U, 678 So. 2d at 963.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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C. Risks of Reporting
Reporting misconduct is a two-edged sword. Those who fail to report
run afoul of the state's disciplinary authorities. 200 Those who report run the
risk of expulsion from the partnership, and with it, attendant loss of work,
financial hardship, and dubious reputation as a whistleblower. 201 Although a
fiduciary duty exists between partners in a law firm, such a duty "does not
encompass a duty to remain partners. 2 °2 Despite arguments that such an
extension of a partner's duty is necessary to prevent retaliation against a
partner who in good faith reports suspected misconduct, the court in Bohatch
held that "Ulust as a partner can be expelled... over disagreements about
firm policy... a partner can be expelled for accusing another partner of
[misconduct] without subjecting the partnership to tort damages. 2 3 The
court's majority understood the dissent's concern that "retaliation against a
partner... virtually assures that others will not take these appropriate steps
in the future, ' 2°4 but stated that a lawyer's "duties sometimes necessitate
difficult decisions ... " and that "[t]he fact that the ethical duty to report
may create an irreparable schism between partners [does not] excuse the
failure to report." 0
A mentally disordered attorney may be in a difficult professional
position, but failure to take action on his or her own behalf places partners in
a more difficult position. The partners will likely agonize over decisions
forced on them when the illness or addiction reaches the point where it
impairs the ability to practice. The firm may, as mentioned above, suggest
counseling or threaten expulsion, but once the illness manifests itself by
misconduct, it will be forced to report him or her. The interpersonal
difficulties that such action poses may well be fatal to the survival of the
firm, especially in a small partnership where the principals share something
more than just a professional relationship.
The partnership discussed in the opening anecdote chose to do nothing.
It stood by, wringing its collective hands, as Pfenning's cases dissolved into
a collection of nonactionable disputes, whose statutes of limitations had long
since passed. There is plenty of blame to go around here. Although
200. The watershed case here is In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (I11. 988). See
discussion of this and other issues related to "whistleblowing" in Campbell, supra note 188.
201. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
202. Id. at 546.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 547 (quoting Spector, J., dissenting).
205. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 547.
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Pfenning had ultimate responsibility for his conduct, illness or not, the
inaction of his partners exacerbated an arguably correctible situation. Their
inaction ruined them and, more importantly, ruined the cases of their clients
and made a mockery of the judicial process.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the incidence of malpractice due to mental illness is
statistically not high,2° such a revelation is of small comfort to those clients
forever prevented from pursuing their claims because of unanticipated
attorney misconduct. Of the three parties to an attorney's mental illness-
the client, the attorney, and the law firm-the client is least able to protect
him or herself, and the most likely to suffer damage in the professional
setting.2 °7
Measures in place to arrest lawyer misconduct before it has irremedi-
able consequences are necessarily inadequate to guarantee complete security
for clients. Nevertheless, clients should have some responsibility for their
own cases. This responsibility should never be abdicated in the expectation
that the attorney is some form of savior. Greater client vigilance in
selecting, monitoring, and where necessary, abandoning an attorney may
have prevented many unhappy endings and malpractice suits.
The second party in the trial is the attorney. The justice system will be
well served if the disordered attorney is able to seek help or withdraw from
practice before the consequences of misconduct damage reputations and
lives. This is an impossible step for some attorneys, and is where the third
party comes into play.
It is understood that attorneys have a duty to abide by the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and to seek treatment or removal when they are
unable to do so. It is also clear that no attorney works in utter isolation-
even solo practitioners generally have family or friends. The attorney's
employers or partners are the next line of defense, and they have a moral and
ethical duty to protect the interests of all of their clients. They also have a
duty to protect their mentally disordered colleague from further damage to
self and to the profession.
209
206. See discussion infra notes 18-19.
207. Other parties might include family, friends, spiritual advisors, medical personnel,
personal creditors of the attorney, and whomever else the attorney's conduct affects in the
normal course of living.
208. See infra part III.
209. Id.
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Mental illness rarely gives rise to the same measure of compassion as
physical illness or damage. A diagnosis of influenza or a broken leg in a
partner elicits compassion; a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia may still
elicit suspicion, fear, and flight. This must change for two reasons: moral
and pragmatic. The moral question is deeply personal, but the pragmatic
question points straight to the Rules of Professional Responsibility. Failure
to address the existence of a mental disorder in a colleague leads to disaster
for clients, for the attorney, and quite rightly, for the law firm. The spineless
response of Pfenning's partners hurt them all.
Appropriate action by the law firm at the first substantial hint of a
problem or misconduct may be painful, but the consequences of cowardice
are so great that a de facto decision to do nothing is impossible to justify.
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